Reinventing capitalism
January 8, 2011
Economist Brian Arthur from the Santa Fe Institute argues that the ever increasing role of knowledge in value creation makes the foundations of economics badly outdated. Likewise, Peter Drucker predicted that “knowledge may come to occupy the place in the politics of the knowledge-based society which property and income occupied over the three centuries that we have come to call the age of capitalism.”
Luckily, an important and growing body of research and writing is exploring the theoretical nature of capital-centric enterprises. Although most of these efforts are still sketchy, they may well lead to normative implications concerning the allocation of claims and control rights in firms. If this happens, the new approaches may be very different from those principal-agent models that are the norm in capital-centric firms today.
In principal-agent models, employees are viewed as agents of the firm, and the managers of firms are viewed as agents of the shareholders. The management challenge is to design the terms of the relationships in a way that will encourage the agents to behave in ways that benefit the principals.
The firm is viewed as a contracting mechanism between providers of financial capital (the principals) and managers (the agents). Principal-agent models are extremely influential in corporate governance and have in reality formed the basis of mainstream compensation structures.
As early as 1964 Gary Becker coined the term “human capital” to refer to the fact that many of the skills and knowledge required to do knowledge work could only be acquired if “some investment was made in time and resources”.
In his seminal work, Becker considered the implications of the fact that some of the knowledge and skills acquired by employees have a much higher value in some relationships than they do in others. The labor services of employees with specialized skills can thus no longer be modelled as undifferentiated, generic inputs, for which wages and quantity, the number of employees, and the number of hours of work, are determined. Once employees are understood to have specialized skills, it matters which employee does what tasks for what firm. With specific human capital, the productivity of a particular individual depends not just on being part of a firm, but on being part of a particular group of people engaged in a particular task.
More importantly, once acquired, knowledge and skills that are specialized are assets that are at risk following the very same logic as that by which financial assets are at risk.
Is human capital then conceptually the same as financial capital and should investors in firm specific human capital also be seen as principals? Should capitalism accordingly create a much larger number of capitalists?
According to the mainstream principal-agent view of the firm, a corporation is understood to be something apart from each of its participants. The nexus of investments view suggested here offers a view of corporations that stresses willing participation by both financial investors and human capital investors, and the ability of both parties to protect their interests. A firm is essentially about creating long-term contracts when short-term contracts are too bothersome. Reinventing capitalism is about renegotiating many of the things that we have too long taken for granted.
I believe that everybody will benefit, if, in the future, a larger number of workers think like owners and act like investors.
.
Thank you Brian Arthur, Steve Denning, John Hagel, Umair Haque, Gary Becker, Margaret Blair, Ronald Coase, Oliver Williamson, Harold Demsetz, Oliver Hart and Jeff Gates
Background reading. Robert H. Frank in the Boston Globe.
Enterprise 2.0
February 8, 2010

Corporations are the dominant mechanism by which economic activity is organized in our economies. How companies perform and what helps them to perform better are hence questions of huge importance. Corporations have such an enormous influence on our lives that corporate decision-making and actions might well deserve more attention right now than does discussing the new Enterprise 2.0 tools. Or, to put it in another way: what kind of changes in our corporate thinking would enable maximum benefits to be gained from social media?
One key question in corporate governance is, who should have the right to make what decisions, and why.
Instead of thinking that we already know the answer, let’s look at what is going on. Companies that focus on their share price, which is the business press doctrine, have the incentive to shut down, or move operations that are not generating the best possible profits for their shareholders, even though those operations are still generating substantial economic value in the area they are located in.
From the point of view of the people who are employed, and the society where those corporations are located, this is obviously not very efficient. I am not against globalization, quite the contrary, but it is doubtful whether maximizing the value of shares, maximizes social wealth. Can it be that the idea of companies’ “raison d étre” being the maximizing of shareholder value is a dangerously incomplete performance standard in post-industrial economies?
I am not suggesting at all that firms should serve all their stakeholders, or even society at large. I am certainly not talking about social responsibility here. What I am claiming is that there are other parties, other than shareholders, who have made an investment in the enterprise. In order to understand this, we should start by asking who is contributing to the enterprise, and what, and who is bearing what risk.
The question I am raising here is whether we can think of employees as labour any more. It matters in a very specific way who does what. The contributions of knowledge workers cannot be understood as fixed-wage generic inputs, but they can easily be understood as risk investments, in the very same way as we today understand shareholders’ financial contributions. We should ask whether the current social construct of allocating risks and rewards is inevitable for some reason, or whether it is an outdated industrial artefact that should be redesigned?
A large part of the economic surplus that a company creates is paid to the employees as wages. This is treated as an operating cost. Naturally, costs should be lowered. The picture would look somewhat different if we understood employees as being investors of human capital, and treated them accordingly. Our system of industrial management creates a systemic inefficiency in knowledge-based work. It can only be removed if the worker’s role included a more active (managerial) responsibility leading to responsive, agile practices. This cannot be achieved unless our mental construct of the employer employee relationship changes radically.
The change would mean that employees would explicitly bear the entrepreneurial accountability for the success or failure of the company, as they do any way and additionally benefit from any possible upside, just as shareholders do. From the point of view of corporate governance, it would mean that companies should be run in the interests of their employees, as much as in the interests of their owners.
To be honest, I don’t think that Enterprise 2.0 has that many employees, more contributors of different resources – mainly financial capital and human capital. Some investors invest for a long term, some for a very short term.
Thank you Gary Becker, Margaret Blair and Yochai Benkler




Is the way we think about firms helping us to meet the challenge of the future or is the mainstream theory of the firm an obstacle for us? Firms are social and legal constructs. They are what we think firms are. Should we renew our old social construct of the firm being based on mass production and high capital costs to a newer version, a knowledge- and innovation-based view of the firm?





